Casting Through Ancient Greece
Casting Through Ancient Greece
87: Megara & Delium
How did Athenian victories at Pylos and Sphacteria become the turning point in the Peloponnesian War? Discover how these pivotal moments forced Sparta to rethink their entire strategy and seek diplomatic solutions. We explore the newfound aggression in Athenian tactics as they aimed to isolate Sparta by targeting its allies, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of ancient Greece.
Uncover the dramatic and covert plans of Athenian generals Demosthenes and Hippocrates as they attempted to capture Megara amid its internal political chaos. The city, caught between conflicting factions, became a crucial battleground. Our narrative delves into the tense standoff that ensued when the plot was exposed, highlighting the complex interplay of local politics and strategic military operations.
Lastly, we shift our focus to the Athenian invasion of Boeotia and the consequential Battle of Delium. Learn about the strategic decisions and unique tactical formations employed by the Boeotians under Pagondas' command. From impassioned speeches to chaotic clashes, we unravel the heavy casualties and pivotal outcomes that redefined ancient Greek warfare. Tune in for an insightful analysis of these significant events and their lasting impact.
We can be confident that we shall have on our side the gods whose temple they have unlawfully fortified and now hold, confident too in the favourable appearance of the victims we have sacrificed. Let us go forward against them and show them that they must get what they want by attacking people who will not defend themselves. But as for us, we make it a point of honour always to fight for the freedom of our country and never unjustly to enslave the country of others and from us. They will not get away without having to fight for it. Part of the speech delivered to the Boeotians before the Battle of Dillium, recounted by Thucydides. Hello, I'm Mark Selleck and welcome back to Casting Through Ancient Greece, episode 87, megara and Dillium. 87, megara and Dillium, the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War, 424 BC, would see the first major strategic advantage shift to one of the belligerents.
Speaker 2:Before this point, both Athens and Sparta had been conducting the war they thought to be over within a year or two in an ever-increasing stalemate. The Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria would change that, where a sizable contingent of Spartiites were taken into captivity as well as a large amount of Peloponnesian ships in Athens' possession. For Sparta and the Peloponnesians, this was a major setback For Sparta. The capture of their citizens was a huge blow due to the importance that was placed on this class within their society class within their society, while the loss of their fleet at Pylos would mean waging war on the sea was going to become almost impossible in the direct aftermath, especially against an enemy who had already held the advantage at sea. This shook Sparta as well as the rest of the Greek world, and would see the Spartans look to enter diplomatic talks, though with not much being achieved for the time being. Back in Athens, the appetite for this more offensive approach to the war gained traction within the Athenian assembly. The moderates within the Athenian government had tried to warn against this type of approach, though after Sphacteria and seeing what resulted, cleon and those with the same outlook gained more support for their aggressive approach. This would then result in more offensive actions into the Peloponnese, where similar actions were arranged. The idea was to establish a number of forts around the Peloponnesian coast where raids could be sent in against Spartan lands or against their allies. Being so close to the Peloponnese and in established positions, these operations would be able to take the Peloponnesians by surprise, as they would be launched at any time in any place, with very little warning. Athens' follow-up offensives into the Peloponnese would be met with a lacklustre response by the Spartans, who appear to have been paralysed by the shock of bacteria. It seems likely that Sparta would have been dealing with a great debate on how to proceed within their own government structure, but we are left to speculate on this point, since we are given no insight For this episode.
Speaker 2:We are going to be staying in 424 BC and we will be looking at further offensive actions that Athens would take while the strategic advantage swung in their favour. We have covered over actions that had been directly targeted at Sparta, but now we will see Athens look to target their allies. Although the advantage was with Athens, they were looking to increase this advantage by attempting to take Sparta's allies out of the war. This would be done to secure Athens from any further invasions, while also removing the threat of powerful allies who could attack from other areas outside the Peloponnese. For the first part of the episode, we will be focusing on Athenian actions against the polis of Megara who, as we have seen, held a vital position heading into the Corinthian isthmus. If this position could be secured, then it would be much harder for the Peloponnesian army to march out and invade Attica. For the second part of the episode, we will then turn to the Athenians' push into Boeotia, an attempt to counter thieves who had their eye on creating a Boeotian League under their command. The result of this push would see a large set-piece battle take place at Delium, where a shift in tactics amongst the hoplite armies would take place and where we will also get some reports of a strange device being used against the Athenians. If Athens could separate these areas from the Peloponnesian League, then Sparta would become more isolated and less options open to them. In their current state, this would put the Spartans in an even worse position while trying to conduct diplomatic negotiations.
Speaker 2:As we have seen in the series, megara had been a part of both the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues at different times. Before the First Peloponnesian War, they had been a part of both the Delian and Peloponnesian leagues at different times. Before the First Peloponnesian War, they had been a member of the Peloponnesian League but, due to disputes with Corinth, they would defect to the Delian League, which would be one of the contributing factors to the breakout of the First Peloponnesian War in 460 BC. However, after the Thirty Years' Peace was made, megara would be forced to return to the Peloponnesian League.
Speaker 2:Megara would once again become a focal point of both Athens and Sparta as tensions between them increased. It lay on the Attic side of the Corinthianismis and was recognised as a strategically important position. If Athens held influence or had control of the city, it would make defending their lands far easier and make it far more difficult for an invader to come out of the Peloponnese into Attic territory. For this reason, sparta looked to also exert influence here, as their plans, if war was to erupt, was to march this land route into Athenian territory. For Sparta, as well as other Peloponnesian cities, megara was also important from an economic standpoint. Megara had good trading relationships with many cities and islands throughout the Aegean, many within the Adelian League. This trade network would then extend into the Peloponnese from Megara, effectively seeing goods from the Eastern Greek cities make their way into the Peloponnese via Megara.
Speaker 2:By 432 BC, tensions between Athens and Sparta were reaching their height and both sides had been planning for the eventuality of war. Athens would target Megara economically in an attempt to influence them politically, they would impose sanctions on the city, otherwise known as the Megarian Decree, which would ban them from harbours and marketplaces of those cities within the Athenian Empire. This effectively strangled the economy of Megara, but would also have a flow-on effect to those cities in the Peloponnese that traded with them. Also, this action would inflame the already increasing tensions between Athens and Sparta, with it being cited by many historians as one of the major contributors to the breakout of the Second Peloponnesian War. As one of the major contributors to the breakout of the Second Peloponnesian War, megara would remain in the Peloponnesian League, and Athens was unable to force its will on the city for the time being. This would see that Sparta would be able to lead a Peloponnesian army into Attica during the opening of the conflict, and every year after up to 424 BC, athens would direct limited raiding actions on Megara, but it would ultimately hold out within the Peloponnesian League despite its suffering under the sanctions.
Speaker 2:For the first seven years of the Peloponnesian War, megara would not be a major focus of Athens, though they would still mount their raids into the surrounding areas regularly. Instead, athens would initially remain on the defensive, responding to Spartan moves. Eventually, this would see Athens focus on other areas further away where both sides would have interests. Now, though, with Sparta humbled after Sphacteria, pylos and the subsequent raids of the Peloponnese, athens would turn to Sparta's allies that bordered Attica. The first in their sights would be Megara. The first in their sights would be Magara, although Athens held Spartan citizens hostage to prevent another invasion of Attica, if they could take control in and around Magara they would further secure their position for the future. Also, by knocking out key allies of Sparta, they would ensure Sparta would be left with reduced influence at the negotiation table.
Speaker 2:With the economic strain that had been affecting Megara over the years, tensions within the city had seen that the Democrats had sent the oligarch faction members into exile. This development had caused some concern for the Peloponnesians, who had stationed a garrison nearby, at Naseer, to keep watch. The Megarian exiles had been causing trouble for the Democrats within the city, where they would harass those travelling into the Peloponnese and would end up occupying the port of Parge. This would cut off Megara's last sea connection that ran through the Corinthian Gulf, and they now could only rely on supplies coming by road from the Peloponnese. However, the exiles and suspicions of the mostly oligarchic Peloponnesians would see this was not the most cooperative relationship. Due to the difficulties that Megara was facing, the people within the city had begun to talk about how they could survive into the future. They would come to the conclusion that it would be best for them to recall the exiles, in the hope that the attacks on the road would stop and they would regain their use of the port of Parge. It was hoped that this would then ease some of the pressure the city was facing, while also leaving them only one enemy to focus on.
Speaker 2:This recall of exiles had taken place outside the authority of the democratic leaders of the city, and they now began to worry about their future. With their return, the democratic leaders saw things the other way to the people. Instead, they now deemed it was best to hand over the city to Athens than, rather, have their rivals return to Megara. As you can probably see, the two sides had very different motivations for their views. The people were suffering under the conditions of the sanctions that had been made worse by part of their population being exiled. The leaders, on the other hand, were more worried about their their position and future, given how they treated the exiled citizens. With these concerns of the leaders, they would now enter into talks with the Athenian generals. This turn of events in Megara had now seen a new opportunity to take control of the city for Athens and instead of the regular raids that were conducted each year, they would be able to make a more direct attempt of removing the city from the Peloponnesian League.
Speaker 2:With the democratic leaders of Megara, the Athenian generals Demosthenes and Hippocrates would devise a plan to take the city. As we have pointed out, a Peloponnesian garrison had been stationed at the port of Nicaea to keep watch over the democrats of Megara. So the first Athenian moves would be to occupy the long walls connecting Megara to Nicaea. This would see that the Peloponnesians would be blocked from coming out to support the city. Then, once this was achieved, the Democrats then planned to hand over the city in an act of betrayal. It appears that plans made with Athens were done secretly. This would make it seem as though the Athenians were acting on their own accord. Once they achieved their initial objective of the long walls and made demands on the city, the Democrats would then be able to take steps to see that the Athenians could capture the city. The Athenian fleet would sail for the island of Minna, just off the coast of Megara, with 600 hoplites under the command of Hippocrates. From here, these forces would establish themselves in a quarry which had been used to create the stone walls connecting to the port and city. A second force, under the command of Demosthenes, would come over land and set themselves an ambush even closer to the port of Nicaea, where they could observe the gates.
Speaker 2:With the Athenians ready to take their initial objectives, the plan would now be executed. The plan was to ensure that the port gates would remain open long enough for the Athenians to enter from their positions. This would be achieved through a routine action the Megarians had undertaken regularly to confuse the Athenians who had been observing the Megarians from Manoa. Previously, they had been in the habit of taking a boat from Nicaea down to the water, acting if they were going to go on a raid After dark. They would then carry the boat back up to the port on a cart, back inside the gates. This was supposed to have confused the Athenians who were blockading the Megarians, as when daylight came, the boat would no longer be seen on the water, this then giving the impression the Bagerians had slipped the Athenian blockade.
Speaker 2:The Democrats would now use this action that had become routine for the Peloponnesian guards at the gates to create an opportunity for the Athenians to enter. With the Athenians laying in ambush and observing the gates. The boat would be brought back up to the port. The guards would open the gates as usual, but this time the Athenians would rush towards the gates while the boat prevented them from being shut. To ensure the boat would block the entrances long enough, the Megarian Democrats would set upon the guards from within the walls, killing them.
Speaker 2:With the commotion taking place, those Peloponnesians nearest to the gates would now react and attempt to repel the attack. A Plataean contingent had accompanied Demosthenes' force and would defeat these forces, ensuring they held control of the gate and allowed the Athenians to come pouring through and make for the long walls. Here they would engage the garrison, who for a time held firm. But after some time and the attacks coming from the Athenians as well as the Megarians, the garrison had assumed that Megara had also risen up and the whole city was against them. The Peloponnesians would retreat from the walls and would fall back with inside Nicaea as the sun rose.
Speaker 2:The Athenians now held control of the wall and the people inside Megara were confused by the events taking place down by the port. Now the Democrats inside Megara would prepare to enact their part of the plan to see the city fall into Athenian hands. Inside the city. They had convinced the people that to save their city from the Athenians, they needed to march out and oppose them. It had been prearranged that when the gates to the city were opened to allow everyone to march out, the Athenians would also rush these gates, since the Democrats would be amongst the people exiting the gates. The plan was to lather themselves in olive oil, so the Athenians would know that they were acting on their side. By this stage, the Athenians had also been reinforced by another 4,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry that had marched overland to help secure their initial positions, with the Athenians reinforced, waiting for the gates to open and the Democrats in the position at the gates ready to carry out their plan. What had so far gone as plan now began to falter. One of those Megarians who was part of the democratic plans would seem to now develop a moral compass, realising what was awaiting his fellow Megarians. He would reveal the plot to the leaders of the oligarchs who came up onto the gates and attempted to convince the people that the gates should remain closed. Thucydides tells us that they did not reveal at this stage that they were aware of the plot by the Democrats to betray the city, but put themselves in a position to ensure that they could not open the gates.
Speaker 2:As the day wore on, the Athenians became aware that something had gone wrong inside the city. As the gates had not yet opened as arranged, it became apparent to the generals that they were not going to be able to take the city by assault, so instead they would focus on trying to take full control of Nicaea from the Peloponnesian garrison by blockading it. The thought was that if they could capture the port before help could arrive, the Megara might surrender to the Athenians. Athenian preparations were carried out for the rest of the day, and by the next the Peloponnesian garrison had become very concerned of their position. They had no supplies or food, as this had usually come from Megara itself. They also felt completely isolated and cut off from any chance of rescue. Remember, here the garrison had been under the assumption that they were under attack by not only the Athenians but also the whole of Megara. With these concerns, the garrison would take the decision to surrender on terms with the Athenians. Athens now held Nicaea and would go about demolishing the long walls at the point where it met Megara. With this complete, they now prepared for the next move against Megara.
Speaker 2:We had seen last episode that Sparta had been somewhat paralysed by the events of 424. To this point this seems to have been a general perception, as the forces would be split into small detachments sent all over the countryside in an attempt to counter Athenian moves. However, these forces would be too small to have any real effect. But there would be one Spartan force that appears to have not been affected by the demoralisation that had set in. This probably had something to do with its commander, and we have come across him before. This is, of course, brassidus, who, in Thucydides' account, comes across as a commander always looking to take the initiative. Brassidus, at this time happened to be in the area of Sicyon and Corinth as he was preparing to gather forces to lead into Thrace. This appears to be one example of the Spartans looking to take the initiative. However, as we will see, only a modest number of Spartans would be involved.
Speaker 2:Brasidas had gotten the word of the fighting around Megara and became concerned with the Peloponnesian garrison at Nicaea. And became concerned with the Peloponnesian garrison at Nicaea, he sent an envoy off to make contact with the Boeotians and request them to send a force to meet him on the north shore of the Isthmus. Brassidas set off with a force of 2,700 Corinthians, 600 Siconians, 400 Philistines, as well as the troops that had already been under his command. He had intended to make for Nicair as quickly as possible to relieve the garrison, but upon arriving in the area he discovered it had already fallen, so changed his approach. The army made its way to the coast where it was to meet the Boeotians and establish their camp. He then took 300 picked men in an attempt to remain undetected and march towards Megara. These movements had been carried out under darkness to help achieve this.
Speaker 2:His objective was to try and prevent Megara falling into Athenian control before they knew what was happening, though he would encounter resistance with the two factions inside Megara once he made contact with them. Both were apprehensive of Spartan intervention, the Democrats thinking he would drive them out and restore the oligarchs to a position of power, while the oligarchs feared that, due to the Democrats' fear of Spartan intervention, fighting would break out between the factions in the city and it would be lost. In this manner, the Megarians appear to have hoped that the Athenians and Peloponnesians would fight it out. Then they could throw their lot in with the victorious side. Peloponnesians would fight it out, then they could throw their lot in with the victorious side, with Brasidas not getting the result he was seeking. He returned to camp with his forces to establish a new plan of attack.
Speaker 2:It was around this time that the Boeotians had arrived with a considerable force 2,200 hoplites and 600 cavalry. The Athenian actions around Megara had concerned the Boeotians even before the request for forces had come from Brasidas. If Megara and its surrounds were under Athenian control, it would close off their land link with the Peloponnesians. Brasidas, with the arrival of the Boeotians, would now have an army numbering some 6,000 troops. Brasidas decided to hold his ground for now, as it provided him an advantageous position, while he was also hoping that his arrival would cause the 5,000 Athenians to pull back and not attempt to take Megara.
Speaker 2:Athens had taken the decision to not make an attempt on Megara at this stage. Now that an army slightly larger than theirs was in the area, some light skirmishing would take place between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, but ultimately, brasidas' patience would be rewarded. The majority of the Athenian force, seeing a stalemate over Megara develop, since neither side would march on the other, would leave the area and march back into Attica. However, a garrison would be left behind to retain control of the port of Nicaea. With the Athenians departing the area, brasidas would once again approach the Megarians, this time around. Since the Athenian army had departed, he was now admitted into the city. The result of this would see the exiled oligarchs take back control of Megara, with many of the democrats involved in the plot fleeing the city. Those who remained would end up being identified by their opponents and condemned, while Megara itself would now be governed by a much narrower government that would be on the friendliest terms of Sparta and as fierce rivals with Athens than it had ever been With the crisis in the area now adverted.
Speaker 2:Brasidas would now dismiss his allied contingents, while he would return to Corinth to continue preparations for his campaign into Thrace. The campaign of Brassidus will be the main focus of our next episode. After the failure at Megara, Athens would launch yet another offensive, this time to the north of Boeotia. This Athenian push north would, it seems, have been conceived around the same time as the plan on Megara, with both having a similar objective, the main idea being to defeat and have Sparta's allies capitulate to the Athenians. Both areas were also important to secure, as they were on the border with Attica. Megara was to try and prevent easy access for the Athenians into Attica, while securing the Boeotian border would prevent Athens being attacked from the north, draining resources away from the focus of the Peloponnesians. This plan appears to have been designed to further isolate Sparta while at the same time making Athenian borders even more secure. If this could be achieved, it would put Sparta in an even tougher position when negotiating with Athens. Even though the first part of the plan against Megara failed, it didn't stop them from carrying out the second part With the plans around the Boeotian invasion.
Speaker 2:Athens had the assistance of many democratic factions within the various Boeotian cities. For the most part, these factions were not in control of their governments, but with Athenian help they looked to change that. Like at Megara, there would be two points of effort. The first would be in the west, commanded by Demosthenes, and would see a force of 40 ships sail for Neopactus and meet with some of the democratic factions in the area. The plan had been for them to arrange so that the port of Sophia and the Polis of Chaeronea would be betrayed to the Athenians, giving them a foothold in the region. The other main effort would be directed at Dillium, near the eastern coast of Boeotia and just across the Attic border.
Speaker 2:This two-pronged attack, we are told by Thucydides, was to take place simultaneously. This was designed to make sure that the Boeotians wouldn't be able to mask their forces against the incursion coming from across the Attic border With the action in the west. Attention was needed there as there was a threat of these cities going over to the Athenians. It was hoped that with the capture of these three locations, a large uprising of the Democrats throughout Boeotia might take place. Otherwise, if this did not eventuate, as the Athenians wished, they would hold key fortified locations in enemy territory that they could launch raiding actions from these bases would also serve as locations that those Boeotians opposed to the current regime could find refuge. This would set up a similar situation that had been taking place around the Peloponnese.
Speaker 2:So this was the plan to take place and, given the period of time it was taking place in and the distance between the two main efforts, there seems like there could have been a lot that could go wrong, and that it did. Although the planning took place and the fleet had sent out during the summer, it wouldn't be until the beginning of the winter that the Athenians would begin to take action. Thucydides doesn't give us much in the way of why it took a number of months from the fleet sailing for them to act in the west. He simply states that mistakes were made about the dates on which the two forces were to set out. But, as Donald Kagan suggests, problems may have arisen due to the democratic factions in the west not being able to secure the support they needed in the time frame first outlined for the cities to be handed over to the Athenians. With such a delay occurring and Demosthenes relying on a number of allies in the region to bolster his Athenians, the risk greatly increased that his plans would not remain secret, the risk greatly increased that his plans would not remain secret.
Speaker 2:Demosthenes would learn, when finally sailing onto Sophia, that his plans had made it to the ears of the Boeotians. The Athenian plans were betrayed by a Phocaean to the Spartans, who then ensured the Boeotians were aware of what was being planned by the Athenians in the west. With this knowledge, Boeotians from many cities were sent west to help shore up these areas that were the target of the Athenians. They were able to achieve this mobilization without much drama, as the Athenian forces, commanded by Hippocrates, had not yet crossed the border into Boeotia. The result of this would see that Demosthenes, when arriving at Sefea, was unable to take the port, Both of Athens' targets were greatly reinforced, and once Demosthenes, when arriving at Seville, was unable to take the port, Both of Athens' targets were greatly reinforced, and once Demosthenes worked out the plans had been betrayed to the enemy, the campaign in the west stalled. Finally, Hippocrates set out with his army and made for Delium, though this movement took place after the Boeotians had already returned from the west. This indicates that some time elapsed between Demosthenes' launching his action and Hippocrates crossing the border, Beyond Thucydides' explanation that there was some confusion over the date to launch the invasion.
Speaker 2:It appears that Hippocrates may have been awaiting word from Demosthenes on the situation in the west. Given the delays that had occurred beforehand, However, Hippocrates would make it to Delium with his army and would begin fortifying it. Thucydides gives us some detail on how this was done. A ditch was dug all around the temple and its precincts. The earth thrown up from all the digging was made to form a rampart in which stakes were fixed, Vinewood cut from the temple grounds and thrown in together with stones and bricks from the houses nearby, which were demolished. So they did everything that they could to raise the level of the fortifications. Wooden towers were put up where necessary and where temple buildings were inadequate for defence. We are told that most of these defensive works were completed after five days of being at Delium, where the main part of the army began withdrawing towards the attic border. A garrison was left in place and hippocrates remained to continue overseeing the finishing touches of the fortifications.
Speaker 2:However, the Boeotians did not remain idle. After hearing of the incursion into their lands Over the five days that the construction was going on at Delium, they began assembling their forces. Forces from throughout Boeotia would march towards the Attic border and assemble at Tanagra, not far from Delium. Once the army had assembled, it was discovered that the Athenian army had already set out back towards Attica. The Boeotians were commanded by 11 contingent generals, and discussions took place to decide their next move. All but one were in favour of not marching out to give battle, since the Athenians were departing their territory.
Speaker 2:However, the one man who was for engaging the Athenians happened to also be in supreme command. This was Pagondas from Thebes, and he would address the army, thinking the risk was well worth it, as he thought the Athenians were vulnerable. His speech would highlight that what they faced was not the battles of the past involving disputes over borderlands, but the stakes were much higher, with their survival as independent cities at risk. He would highlight what his men were fighting for their homes, families, land and gods. These were the most important factors for these men, who were generally from the agricultural class. Armies defending their homelands tended to have better success rates because of what was at stake for them individually, so the commanders would lean into this. He would also remind the men of their responsibility in battle, helping invoke the values of sacrifice, while he would also take measures to ease the men's nerves.
Speaker 2:By highlighting the bravery of the Boeotians, which would prevail over numbers, Pigondas was able to motivate and persuade his army that attacking the Athenians was the right course of action to take. His men had already been gathered in companies with their weapons, so he was able to set out at once towards the Athenians. Although the Athenians had turned to make their way back to Attica, the Hoplites had rested, establishing a camp, and it's this part of the Athenian army that the Boeotians would march on. Hippocrates, still at Delium, would receive word of the Boeotians on the move. He would send orders for the hoplites to form up in line of battle, where he would then set out to join with the army. He would leave in place at Delium a force of 300 cavalry to guard against the attack there or, if the situation arose, to intervene in the main battle.
Speaker 2:Meanwhile, the Boeotians had come up in the area of the Athenians but halted putting a hill between the two armies, where they then deployed their line in the formation they had wished to fight in. Their forces included 7,000 hoplites, over 10,000 light troops, 1,000 cavalry and 500 peltists. The Thebans, who were the most powerful of the Boeotian cities, would hold a position of honour on the right. They had also been made aware of the Athenian cavalry force at Delium so had to attach some troops to deal with them if needed. The battle line the Boeotians would deploy in was also somewhat different to what we're used to hearing about in hoplite battles. The main part of the battle line would be composed of the heavier hoplites, but on the wings, we are told that the light troops and cavalry would be positioned. This would see that during the battle they could attempt to threaten the Athenian flanks while their line was engaged. Another difference we hear about is to do with the depth of a hoplite contingent. From most accounts we hear hoplite phalanxes would usually deploy 8 ranks deep. However, the Theban contingent would deploy their phalanx 25 deep, this effectively setting up the right of the Boeotian line as a battering ram. The Athenians on the other side of the hill had also deployed their line as Hippocrates, who was now with the army, had ordered. They had roughly the same numbers of the Boeotians, as many of their light troops had already departed into Attica as they had set out before the hoplites marched from Delium. The hoplite line would be the standard eight ranks deep, while the flanks would only have the cavalry on either side. Due to the lack of light, troops With the Athenians drawn up.
Speaker 2:Hippocrates went down the line delivering a speech to encourage the men before battle was joined Athenians, he began. This will only be a short speech, but a short speech is as good as a long one when it is addressed to brave men. I do not wish to rouse your emotions so much as to remind you of the facts. I do not want any of you to think that, because we are in the country of foreigners, this danger into which we are throwing ourselves does not concern us. We shall fight in their country, but we shall fight for our own. If we are victorious, the Peloponnesians, without the support of the Boeotian cavalry, will never again invade our land, and in one battle we'll both gain this country and do much to free our own. Go forward, then, to meet them in the spirit of the citizens of a city which they are proud to call the first in Hellas.
Speaker 2:Hippocrates had only made it halfway along the Athenian line when the Boeotians could be heard singing their and began advancing towards the Athenians down the hill. With a surprise, the address to the troops stopped and the Athenians also got underway. Thucydides tells us that both lines would clash at a run. However, the extreme flanks of both would not meet, as their advance was slowed down due to geographical considerations. As with most hoplite battles, the initial struggle was stubborn, as each side looked to break the will of the other. Eventually, the Boeotian left, all the way up to the centre, was defeated by the Athenians. The Thespians would take the heaviest casualties in this part of the line, as, when the other contingents gave way, the Thespians would find themselves surrounded. We also hear from Thucydides, a friendly fire taking a toll on the Athenians.
Speaker 2:The encircling movement that took place around the Thespians would see parts of the Athenian line becoming confused and they would strike down some of their own. However, on the Boeotian right, it was a different story, with the Theban battering ram, pushing back the Athenians step by step. Pangondas, who was with the Thebans, was able to see the trouble that the left was in and would try and stop the Athenians being able to cause more havoc on the Boeotian line. He would order two squadrons of cavalry around the hill so they would not be seen by the Athenians to where they would emerge on the Athenian right, surprising them. This action would have the result of completely turning the tide of battle in the favor of the Boeotians. The Athenian right, once seeing the cavalry appearing out of nowhere, now thought that another army was marching on their flank. This had completely stopped the Athenians victorious advance and instead saw the Athenian right panic and fall back. The panic that set in would now start spreading down the line, seeing the entire Athenian battle line in retreat. This retreat was anything but orderly, as parts of the Athenian line would flee in all directions. The Boeotian cavalry would continue the fighting by chasing down. Many of those fleeing until the coming of night would bring a stop to the fighting.
Speaker 2:The next day, those Athenians who had retreated back to Delium and nearby areas would return to friendly territory by sea. However, even after this defeat, Athens still held control of Delium, with them leaving a garrison in place. The Boeotians, in the aftermath of the battle, would establish a trophy on the field, collected up their own dead and stripped the Athenian dead and set a guard over them so that the Athenians would have to come and negotiate the release of them. The army then marched back to Tanagra, where plans were made on how to proceed. A series of complicated negotiations would now take place so that the Athenians could recover their dead. However, initially the Athenian herald would not secure the release of the bodies. The main sticking point was that the Athenians needed to depart Boeotian territory before they could retrieve their fallen. Back in Tanagra, plans were going ahead for an assault to be conducted on Delium, where the Athenians still held the sanctuary. A force was put together to attempt to bring the area back under the ocean control. This would be made up of light troops mostly consisting of javelin throwers and slingers, while they would be reinforced by 2,000 Corinthian hoplites. A series of attacks would be mounted on the Athenians at Delium, but it wasn't until a strange flame-throwing engine was built that the garrison would be defeated.
Speaker 2:Thucydides describes the construction of this machine. They took a great beam sorted in two parts, both of which they completely hollowed out, and then fitted the two parts closer together again, as in the joints of a pipe. A cauldron was then attached with chains to one end of the beam, and an iron tube, curving down into the cauldron, was inserted through the hollow part of the beam. Much of the surface of the beam itself was plated in iron. Thucydides then goes on to tell us how this machine was employed against the fortifications at Delium. They brought up this machine from some distance on carts to the part of the wall that had been principally constructed of vines and other wood. When it was close to the wall, they inserted into their end of the beam large bellows and blew through them. The blast, confined inside the tube, went straight into the cauldron, which was filled with lighted coals, sulphur and pitch, which was filled with lighted coals, sulfur and pitch. A great flame was produced, which set fire to the wall and made it impossible for the defenders to stay at their posts. This would see the fall of Delium, with the defenders fleeing from their position, which allowed the Boeotian troops to now capture the fortifications. Some of those Athenians fleeing were killed or captured. The rest of the garrison were able to escape and return to Attica by sea. Finally, the Athenians were able to secure the release of those who had fallen during the Battle of Delium, with it now being a week after the battle took place.
Speaker 2:Now the Athenians could get a picture of their losses from the battle. Even in the aftermath it would have been difficult to know how badly they had suffered due to the forces being scattered and some still holding out in Boeotian territory. However, now they would recover a great many light troops and 1,000 Athenian hoplites, of whom one was their general Hippocrates Delian, would mark the greatest loss of troops in a single battle for the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. So far, these Athenian offensives to try and knock out some of Sparta's allies had failed where, it seems, the complicated nature of the movements, communications and reliance on allies had seen the plan left open for many opportunities for things to go wrong. Even with this, Athens could hope to gain some local successes, but the tactical brilliance of the Theban commander Pengondis outshone the Athenian commanders.
Speaker 2:Heading into the late stages of the 424 campaigning season, Athens had hoped to weaken Sparta's positions further. However, with these defeats in the west and in Boeotia, Sparta was encouraged and would now hold out in the face of what had previously seemed like a hopeless position. These defeats would also have political ramifications back in Athens, With the moderates gaining more influence. The aggressive policy of Cleon and his supporters had been shown to be a failure and even harm Athens' position. Perhaps the policy wasn't a reckless one in general, as if things had gone to the Athenians' advantage. A series of further successes would have seen Athens in a powerful position, but ultimately, it seems the plan that was put in place to follow. This policy was far too complicated and open to too much chance and factors out of the Athenians' control. Perhaps, after the Athenians' great successes in the first part of the year, they had become overconfident and now luck was turning against them.
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