Casting Through Ancient Greece
Casting Through Ancient Greece
89: The Tenuous Truce
What if the triumphs of a powerful city could gradually slip away? In this episode of Casting Through Ancient Greece, we explore how Athens' dominance began to erode, not through immediate disaster, but through a series of missteps and lost opportunities. Once at the height of its military and political influence, Athens' advantage waned as strategic errors and unsuccessful campaigns chipped away at its position. From remarkable victories, such as the capture of over 120 Spartiates, to the costly setback at the Battle of Delium.
As we unravel the political turmoil within Athens, the spotlight is on Thucydides’ trial and subsequent exile, a move driven by internal rivalries and the ambition of figures like Cleon. Explore the broader ramifications of Brasidas' triumphs, which sparked revolts and coerced Athens into a temporary truce with Sparta in 423 BC. We dissect the fragile peace terms, the breaches that ensued, and the precarious nature of maintaining a truce amidst the chaos of war. The political machinations and the struggle for control within Athens reveal the deep complexities and the relentless pressures of leadership during this tumultuous period.
The episode culminates with a detailed look at the military and diplomatic maneuvers that defined this phase of the Peloponnesian War. Follow the Athenians’ strategic repositioning to capture Mende and besiege Scione, supported by Perdiccas of Macedon who thwarted Spartan reinforcements. Uncover the shifting alliances within the Boeotian League and the regional conflicts that further complicated the war. From the failed Athenian attempts to reclaim territories to the nuanced interplay of power, this episode offers a comprehensive understanding of the intricate military strategies and political manoeuvres that shaped the course of this historical conflict.
In the midst of his designs upon the cities in question, a trium arrived with commissioners carrying round the news of the armistice Thucydides. Hello, I'm Mark Selleck and welcome back to Casting Through Ancient Greece, episode 89, carrying around the news of the Armistice Thucydides. Hello, I'm Mark Selleck and welcome back to Casting Through Ancient Greece, episode 89, the Tenuous Truce. Over the past year, we have seen Athens go from a very strong position in the war over Sparta to now where they no longer held an advantage as much as they initially had. This favourable position had begun with the Spartan surrender as bacteria, with over 120 Spartiites going into Athenian captivity, while the Peloponnesian fleet had also been neutralised, with Athens not handing back over the ships after holding them during a truce while negotiations had taken place. This action had seen Athens establish a fort on the Peloponnesian territory that they could mount raids from. Also, athens now had a massive bargaining chip, holding the core citizens of Spartan society hostage. This would see Athens with an advantage in negotiations, while also seeing their own homeland secure for the short term from invasion. Further pressure would be placed on Sparta as the Athenians continued operations into Peloponnesian territory, where they looked to replicate the success at Pylos, this then seeing them. With multiple locations they could raid the Peloponnese from with very little notice.
Speaker 2:Negotiations between Sparta and Athens continued, but although we don't get any detailed accounts of them, it seems Athens repeatedly rejected Spartan approaches, thinking they could gain a peace completely favouring Athens. Given the current situation, however, this advantage they held would begin to slip. This would be during the continued operations when Athens looked to target Sparta's allies. Firstly, their attempt at capturing Magara would fail, with some help from the Spartan general Brasidas preparing for his own expedition, while an ambitious two-prong attack directed at the Boeotians would fail due to the over-complicated nature of the operation. This would end up resulting in the Battle of Delium, where Athens would suffer its worst losses in the war so far. These reverses in fortune would have an impact on negotiations, where Sparta saw Athens now vulnerable to attack.
Speaker 2:This then brought us to last episode, where Brasidas launched a campaign north into Thracian lands, looking at attacking Athenians indirectly. He had at his disposal only a limited force, but with help from allies within Thessaly, he was able to make it into Macedonian territory, where an alliance had been arranged with the Macedonian King Perdiccas. Brasidas' main goal was to capture Amphibolus, which he would achieve then set about prying more areas away from Athenian influence. Although Thrace was well north of Athens, spartan influence in the area would hurt Athens economically and diplomatically. The region was rich in resources vital to Athens, with its many forested areas and precious metal mines. Along with the natural resources, amphipolis lay on the coastal road that connected the east to west and where much trade Athens relied on travelled. Ultimately, brasidas' expedition in 424 was successful, with many cities and villages having revolted from Athens or been taken by his army.
Speaker 2:Heading into 423 BC, athens was no longer in the favourable position they had been in mid-424, when attempting to bring about peace terms on their conditions. Although holding forts in Peloponnesian territory, they had also been undermined in their regional possessions, seeing them needing to devote resources in response. Added to this, reverses in fortune diplomatically, where cities previously allied to Athens, as well as defeats on the battlefield, would now have Athens enemies, seeing them in a far weaker position For this episode. We are going to look at the political and diplomatic aftermath for Assiduza's campaign during 424, while we'll also look at the response Athens would take to respond to Sparta's involvement at Thrace. We have seen how important the city of Amphipolis was to Athens in the series they had invested resources and citizens into establishing a colony in Thrace on the Strymon over the past couple of generations. The first attempt would fail in this notoriously hostile land to outsiders. However, the second time around a generation later, would bring about an Athenian-established colony.
Speaker 2:As Athens grew in wealth and power, the region had become more important for security of trade heading through the coastal road. As well as the raw materials found at this location, the timber from the dense forests would be instrumental in keeping the huge fleet supplied with ships. Brasidas' campaign had now put Athens' war effort in jeopardy, potentially harming their ability to gather the resources needed to continue the war. As well as this, the campaign had undermined Athens' position in the region, with many revolting from them. Another blow to the war economy, with the much-needed tribute not coming in from these cities anymore.
Speaker 2:So, as you can imagine, when the news of the loss of Amphipolis, along with the revolt of other cities, made its way back to Athens, panic set in with them looking to explain the disaster and place blame somewhere. Like with many setbacks, this blame would be placed on one man the general in command of the area. Commanding this northern region of Athenian interests was Thucydides, as we have seen. He had attempted to make it back to Amphipolis before the city surrendered. However, he was too late. He had landed at Aeon, where he was able to beat off an attack led by Brasidas, keeping his possession in Athenian hands.
Speaker 2:This period had seen Cleon as the figure in Athens with the greatest influence at this point, and is often thought he would charge Thucydides as being the scapegoat for the loss of Amphipolis. However, although they came from different viewpoints on policy, laying blame with a commander due to failure was pretty commonplace. Often, the degree of the consequences would also be a factor. Thucydides would end up being put on trial and, for his part, in the loss of Amphipolis, he would be exiled for 20 years. Because of this exile, he would also argue he had been placed in a perfect position to view the conflict, as he was now able to freely move through Peloponnesian territory, where he would be able to view the war from their perspective.
Speaker 2:Given that Thucydides is our main source for the Peloponnesian war and therefore the actions around Amphipolis we need to keep in mind, we are taking his word for it on these events, so some level of scepticism is needed, especially around the questions that he is involved in, such as was it fair to lay the blame for the loss of Amphipolis with him. The problem in answering the question of if Thucydides was to blame for the loss of Amphipolis is down to the fact that the most complete account of the event is the one that Thucydides himself reports In his history. He does not directly address his sentence handed down to him and what took place in the court. Instead, his defense is found in his history of events, where he attempts to report in an objective manner. Perhaps what he says here is likely similar to the arguments he would have given in his hearing. I would like to share what Donald Kagan has put together in his book the Peloponnesian War, from where he summarises the elements from Thucydides' history in what would amount to him defending his position.
Speaker 2:The emergency arose, he might say, when Brasidas made a surprise attack on the bridge over the Strymon. The guard at the bridge was small, partly disloyal and unprepared, so Brassidas took it easily. Responsibility for guarding the bridge belonged to Euclides, the commander of the city. The city was unprepared but managed to rally in time to prevent the immediate treason and sent for me for help. I was at Thassos at the time and set out immediately to relieve Amphipolis, if I could, but to save Eon at least. I made amazingly good time, because I knew the dangers of treason would be great and that my arrival could turn the tide in our favour. If Euclides could have held on one more day, we would have thwarted Brasidas, but he did not. My quickness and foresight saved Eon.
Speaker 2:So, as we can see, thucydides in his history attempts to shift the blame away from himself and shows how he was able to come to the rescue and was at least able to save Eon from being captured. He shifts his blame in the direction of Euclides, who he outlines as being responsible for the city. Had he been able to have the city under tighter control for just a little longer, thucydides would have been able to prevent its falling. Again, we need to keep in mind that this is what Thucydides himself tells us, and on the surface it appears to be a reasonable defence. However, there are elements over the incident he doesn't address. The first thing we need to be aware of although Euclides was in command of the city, thucydides held general command over the region, therefore giving him overall responsibility.
Speaker 2:While one big question that remains unanswered is why was Thucydides at the island of Thassos at the time? It seems very likely that the news of Brasidas' march would have been known to him, so it's unclear why he didn't remain in Thrace, given that Amphipolis and Aeon were Athens' two most important possessions. Given how easily Amphipolis fell, it's also a mystery why measures to ensure Athenian loyalty were not undertaken. However, this doesn't discount the fact that Thucydides may well have been on legitimate business in Thassos. It just seems like a strange time to leave Aeon when an army commanded by a Spartan was heading into lands where Athenian interests lay.
Speaker 2:Ultimately, whatever the defence Thucydides gave was not good enough to convince an Athenian court. Perhaps he was unable to satisfactorily answer what we had brought up. However, there is still one fact that can give us pause. If the punishment given to him was excessive and other motivations were at play, we have already pointed out that Cleon appears to have been the instigator of the proceedings, and the two had different ideas on Athenian policy. What seems strange. If Athens was looking for scapegoats, why don't we hear of Euclides also being put on trial, since he was directly responsible for Amphipolis' fall? Perhaps internal politics may also be playing out around this issue. When it comes down to it, it is difficult for us to say who was at fault for Amphipolis' fall. Based on the information we have and given what we have is from the man who was at fault for Amphipolis' fall, based on the information we have, and given what we have is from the man who was exiled. Though whoever was to blame didn't change the fact that it had taken place.
Speaker 2:And now Athens had a crisis developing around their interest in Thrace, with the revolts taking place up in Thrace and more looking to develop if Brasidas continued his campaign, athens, heading into 423, was now in the mood to seek a truce. For the time being. This, athens hoped, would buy them time so that they could better respond to what was taking place up north, while it also opened the possibility of a general peace being negotiated opened the possibility of a general peace being negotiated. Sparta was also in favour of this truce taking place, as they had issues of Athenian forts dotted around their territory, while Thucydides also says the Spartans suspecting the actual fears of the Athenians and thinking that once they had enjoyed a respite from trouble and misery, they would be more disposed to consent to a reconciliation, to give back the prisoners and to make a treaty for the longer period. So, with both Athens and Sparta seeing that a pause in the conflict would benefit themselves, they would conclude an armistice.
Speaker 2:Though, with all negotiations, conditions of the truce that both had to abide by had to be agreed upon. First and foremost, the truce mandated a complete stop of hostilities between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies. All military operations were to stop immediately, ensuring that no new battles or territorial gains would occur during the truce. This clause was vital in halting the cycle of attacks and counterattacks that had characterised the war up to this point. In addition, the agreement stipulated each side would retain control of the territories and cities they held at the time of the truce's signing. No attempts were to be made to alter the existing power balance or reclaim lost lands through force lands through force.
Speaker 2:This preservation of the status quo was central to maintaining peace, as it prevented either side from gaining an advantage while peace negotiations were ongoing. In an effort to ensure fairness and prevent either power from using its truce to strengthen their position, a clause was included prohibiting the construction of new fortifications. Neither Athens nor Sparta could build or expand any defensive structures during the truce, which was designed to prevent one side from using the truce as an opportunity to fortify strategic locations in preparation for a resumption of hostilities. The temporary suspension of expansionist ambitions ensured that both sides would be negotiating from a position of military equality. The issues of prisoners of war was also addressed in the truce. While captives from both sides were not immediately exchanged, the agreement ensured their humane treatment and established that they would retain the captivity until a long-term peace settlement could be reached, that they would retain them in captivity until a long-term peace settlement could be reached. This clause prevented the immediate resumption of violence over the fate of prisoners and allowed both sides to focus on broader diplomatic issues.
Speaker 2:The truce also sought to restore some degree of normalcy and stability to sacred and religious sites. A provision was made for the restoration or preservation of temples that may have been damaged during the earlier stages of the war. This reflected the deep respect for religious observance in the Greek world, even during wartime, and ensured that the truce was not just a political and military agreement, but also a gesture towards preserving cultural and spiritual heritage a gesture towards preserving cultural and spiritual heritage. Dispute resolution was a key aspect in the truce. Any disagreement that arose during the period would be resolved through arbitration rather than military action. This mechanism provided a means to avoid further escalation and ensured that the truce would hold even if smaller conflicts or misunderstandings arose. Neutral parties could serve as arbiters, which added a layer of impartiality and fairness to the process. In addition to managing conflicts between Athens and Sparta, the truce also addressed the neutrality of third-party states. Both powers agreed to leave neutral city-states out of the conflict and refrain from attempting to sway them into either side of alliance. This provision reduced the risk of proxy conflicts and expanded the scope of the peace to include a wider part of the Greek world.
Speaker 2:The implementation of the truce was carefully monitored through diplomatic channels. Both sides agreed to send envoys to ensure that the terms were being respected. These envoys played a critical role in facilitating ongoing peace negotiations and maintaining communication between the two rival powers. Finally, the truce included a clause respecting sacred and neutral territories, ensuring that religious festivals and sites would remain free from military interference. This reflected the broader Greek tradition of suspending warfare during religious festivals, such as the Olympic truce. Areas like the Sanctuary of Delphi were thus shielded from the broader conflict, preserving the sanctity of these important locations. Despite these well-defined terms, the one-year truce was not entirely successful.
Speaker 2:After both parties had agreed to the terms, events in the north would continue. One of the first breaches of the truce would come when Scone, on the Pele Peninsula, would revolt from Athens. Encouraged by Brasidas, who had been campaigning in northern Greece, the citizens of Scone declared their loyalty to Sparta. In northern Greece, the citizens of Skone declared their loyalty to Sparta. Brasidas, eager to weaken Athenian influence in the region, readily accepted their allegiance. He crossed over by boat from Tyrone, where he had ended his campaign in 424, and united the city towards Sparta, seeing factional disputes evaporate. He then had some of his troops stationed there, as he had designs on attacking other nearby Athenian possessions in the future.
Speaker 2:The news of the truce appears to have frustrated Brasidas, who had been achieving his goals in the north. With the actions in the north still continuing, he would look to victory rather than working towards peace. However, in an attempt to still act as he wished and not anger Sparta, while attempting to appease Athens, he would argue the revolt had taken place just before the signing of the truce. Sparta would accept this claim made by him, although they probably knew the truth and they would view that they were justified in classifying Scone as theirs. Though Athens didn't buy the defence that Brasidas had presented, they knew the timing and how the events up north had unfolded.
Speaker 2:Although the truce had called for arbitration, athens refused to fall back on this mechanism due to the blatant disregard of Brasidas. They chose to instead follow the proposals of Cleon. In their anger of the situation, the Athenians would vote to destroy the city, put all the men to death and sell the women and children into slavery, and this time there would be no second thoughts about it. This would see Athens continue to move further away from the moderate policies of Pericles and in the direction of deterrence through terror proposed by Cleon. In the meantime, brasidas would now continue to push his advantage in the region, although this time there would be no way to claim issues of timing around the truce to defend his actions. Perhaps he had received word of Athens' intentions and saw there was no point in trying to protect the interests of the truce any longer. The city of Mende would now also revolt from Athens, and Brasidas would accept the rebels into his camp. This further angered Athens, who now had arranged a force to move against both cities on the peninsula.
Speaker 2:Brasidas prepared for their arrival. He had forces in Scone and now ordered a garrison to occupy Mende. However, brasidas would now see how thin his forces were. Although he had recruited locals into his army, he had not been able to swell his army further, with the Spartans having earlier refused to send reinforcements. Now, when he needed every man he had under his command, he also had an ally in the region call upon him for assistance. He was not able to refuse this due to him relying heavily on the supplies Perdiccas provided him.
Speaker 2:Perdiccas had requested Brasidas' help in combating the Lysitanians once again, which Brasidas was compelled to agree to if he were to keep his army supplied. The campaign began well, with the Lysitanians being defeated. However, perticus wanted to advance deeper into their lands and attack them again. Brasidas, though, was mindful of his absence from the Chalcidides and wanted to return as soon as possible. In his mind, he had fulfilled his duty to Perticus, but fierce disagreement would erupt over the matter. In addition to this, perticus had been waiting on Illyrian reinforcements to arrive, but they had failed to show. It would eventually be learnt that they had defected to Perdiccas' enemies. This would now see Brasidas and Perdiccas look to withdraw from their position in the face of superior numbers assembling before them, although no clear plan of withdrawal had been settled upon. The Macedonians and their allies retreated during the night, leaving Brasidas and his force behind. Brasidas was now in a tough position, left to face overwhelming numbers. However, brasidas would use his usual military brilliance to defend against the attack mounted on his forces and would bring his army to safety. Mounted on his forces and would bring his army to safety. This episode in Spartan-Macedonian alliance would be the final act, with Perdiccas now treating Brasidas more as an enemy. He saw that his interests were no longer aligned and that it was now in his best interest to get back on friendly terms with the Athenians.
Speaker 2:While Brasidas had been campaigning with Perdiccas, athens had sent off a fleet to attempt to recover the cities taken, in spite of the truce. This expedition was led by Nicias and Nicostratus, who had the intention of not acting against the terms of the peace, but to rectify the situation in Thrace. At the point of the truce being signed, the Athenian fleet, made up of 50 ships, including 10 Chian vessels, established a base at Potidaea to prepare for the recovery of Mende and Scone. The fleet had brought with it 1,000 Athenian hoplites and 600 archers, while, once arriving, they would also be joined by 1,000 Thracian mercenaries and peltas from various friendly towns in the region. At this stage, brasidas was still absent, and the Athenians would first focus on attacking Mende. Currently, the city was defended by the local inhabitants, 300 men from Scone and 700 Peloponnesians, with them being under the command of the Spartan Polydamidas, while Brasidas was absent.
Speaker 2:Initially, pomidamidas and his army occupied a hill outside the city where the Athenians went in with a two-prong attack, One led by Nicias and one by Nicastratus. Firstly, nicias attempted to take the hill with a predominantly lightly armed force by the way of the path leading to the top. However, this would be unsuccessful and Nicias himself would suffer a wound in the attempt. Next, nicastratus led the rest of the Athenian force from a different direction, though the ground was hard going. This, along with the resistance the defenders put up, would see the Athenian force thrown into utter confusion and were to only narrowly escape total defeat. With the failure of the two-pronged Athenian attack, the defenders did not look to yield their ground and, as the day was starting to come to an end, the Athenians retreated to their camp.
Speaker 2:With the Athenians departing, the field and night now falling, the force under Polydamidas returned within the walls of Mende. Nicias and Nicastratus would make another attempt and the next day would manoeuvre to attack the city from a different angle. They would sail their ships to land their troops south of Mende in the direction of Scone, where the Athenians would begin ravaging the lands in an attempt to bring out the defenders. However, while this was happening, spartan control within the walls was weakening the repositioning of the Athenians, had seen the Sconean troops fear for their own city and they fled back to their homes during the night Within Mende, as Polydamidas was preparing his forces to attack. The Democrats of the city now refused to fight and they would end up rushing the Peloponnesian garrison and opening the gates to the Athenians. Those Peloponnesians who were not struck down in the surprise assault would fall back into the citadel of the city or would escape back to Scone. The Athenians poured into the city and although the gates had been opened to them Thucydides tells us they acted as if they had taken the city by storm, with the commanders having a hard time controlling their men from slaughtering the inhabitants. However, finally, order was brought to the army and the Democrats were allowed to retain civil rights, and they were given the responsibility of judging those responsible for the revolt. The Peloponnesians would be cut off in the citadel and a blockade established on them to prevent their escape. This would now see Mende back under Athenian control and preparations were now made to advance onto Scone.
Speaker 2:As the Athenian army advanced south onto Scone, the people and the Peloponnesian garrison in the city came out to oppose them. They occupied a hill in front of the city that would need to be taken before advancing. This time around, the Athenian attack would go in strong and would defeat the defenders, who would dislodge from their position. The Athenians then established their camp, along with a trophy, on this strong ground and turned to preparations for besieging the city on this strong ground and turned to preparations for besieging the city. During the operations of surrounding the city, those Peloponnesians who had been besieged at Mende were able to defeat the guards near the sea to make their escape. They would then make their way down to Skone, where they would, during the night, slip past the besiegers and reinforce those inside the city. Skone would be a prolonged siege that would continue on into 421 BC, but the Athenians would finally capture the city and fulfilled what Cleon had vowed would be done. Once the city was back in Athenian hands, the men were all killed, while the women and children were sold into slavery. The city and the land surrounding it were given over to the Plataeans, who themselves had suffered a similar fate at the hands of the Peloponnesian League.
Speaker 2:Around the same time that the siege was developing around Scone, perdiccas of Macedon sent off a herald to meet with the Athenians. During the talks outside the city, an armistice was negotiated between the Macedonians and Athenians. Once again, armistice was negotiated between the Macedonians and Athenians. Once again, perticus had seen that Athens was returning to the region with a strong force and it was now in his interest to be on friendly terms with them. He was probably banking on the fact that the Athenians were going to retake their possessions in the region. He wanted to ensure that, during the Athenian recovery of land and the look to secure these positions, perticus wanted to see that he could benefit by gaining lands that he had been fighting over with other tribes in the nearby areas.
Speaker 2:Although Athens would have been wary of the request for an alliance with Perdiccas due to his past record with diplomatic matters, the Athenians would have seen it was, for the short term at least, to their advantage to conclude an agreement with him. It was, for the short term at least, to their advantage to conclude an agreement with him, firstly with Sparta, in the area. Athens would rather Perticus on their side. This seeing, brasidas would lose his main supply arrangement, while Perticus's forces would be harassing the Spartans rather than the Athenians. It probably seemed likely. If Athens had snubbed Perticus's offer, he probably would have attempted to mend things with Brasidas, meaning Athens would have other hostile forces to worry about. For Athens, it was far better to just have the rebels of the area and the Peloponnesians to worry about while they attempted to recover their possessions at Thrace.
Speaker 2:Nicias had shown he was concerned with how genuine the alliance with Perdiccas was. Once in place, he would challenge alliance with Perdiccas was once in place, he would challenge how serious Perdiccas was and sought proof of his sincerity. Perdiccas would back up the alliance with an action against the Spartans, who he had shown he was no longer fond of. Brasidas during his campaign had been requesting reinforcements from Sparta, with his request mostly being ignored. However, sparta had finally decided to send out a force to meet up with him at Thrace. Like Brasidas, this force would also need to travel through Thessaly to make contact. This is where Perdiccas would show his worth to the Athenians, while it also suited his own purposes. Perdiccas had maintained good relations with a number of leaders within Thessalian tribes and would see to it that they would deny the reinforcing Spartan force passage through Thessaly.
Speaker 2:The resistance this Spartan force faced on trying to enter Thessaly was far greater than what Brasidas had encountered. This would see that the bulk of the force was unable to enter the territory. Would see that the bulk of the force was unable to enter the territory. Had this army made it into Thrace, it is quite possible that the year's truce may have come to an end very quickly with a larger Spartan force in the region. However, a small detachment did make it into Thrace, made up of three Spartan generals along with some trusted younger Spartans. These generals had been commissioned by the Spartan government to see what Brasidas was up to and wanted Spartan oversight in the region. This probably had something to do with Sparta being uncomfortable with Brasidas' actions during the truce. During this period there was also the indication that what we call the Peace Party was back with more influence in Sparta, as these men were from that faction and were looking to keep to the terms of the truce so a more stable peace could be negotiated.
Speaker 2:The Spartan intention here was to have the commanders and other leaders to post themselves in the various cities to act as governors. This would see each city with a clear command structure and, most importantly, one that had the Spartan government's interests at hand. Up to this point, it had been men directly under Brasidas' command that were taking on these roles. Now, though, an official Spartan policy could be maintained even when these cities were so far from Sparta. However, this move by Sparta had now damaged Brasidas' reputation in the region. So far, cities had been going over to him, with minimal fighting having to take place. In return for these cities defecting, he had allowed them to maintain their political rights and were free to mostly govern themselves. Now, though, with the official Spartan policy being followed in the region, it would seem the art of smart diplomacy may now disappear, with less imaginative means relied upon to keep order and control over these cities. This flood of cities handing themselves over to Brasidas because of his reputation in how he handled matters would begin to stop.
Speaker 2:To the cities of Thrace, they were now faced with the prospect of swapping one master controlling their affairs for another. Prospect of swapping one master controlling their affairs for another. Although the truce had subdued events unfolding within Greece, there were still some developments taking place, these in and around cities allied to either Sparta or Athens. Both Athens and Sparta had avoided conflict within Greece to avoid breaking the truce, though Brasidas' controversial actions in Thrace being the exception, though Brasidas' controversial actions in Thrace being the exception. But these allies of Sparta and Athens still looked to take advantage over their own situation and, with their nearby rivals In Boeotia, thieves now had an opportunity to act against Thespia, a city west of them, still in Boeotian territory.
Speaker 2:Although Thespia was part of the Boeotian League and therefore part of the Peloponnesian League, thebes saw reason that action had to be taken against the city. The previous year, the Thespians had fought alongside Thebes at the Battle of Delium and had taken heavy casualties. This seems it may now have some connection to Thebes accusing the city of having sympathies for Athens or, as Thucydides says, they had the charge of Atticism levelled against them. Although Thucydides doesn't spell things out for us, it appears this suffering at Delium may have changed the political opinion within Thespio. The city had lost a great deal of its fighting aged men at Delium and, although a victory, it may not have felt as so for the thespians. This may have led to democratic elements in the city being able to spread their influence and possible overtures may have gone in the direction of Athens.
Speaker 2:As we had seen, the creation of the Boeotian League was not something that a lot of cities went into willingly. Like other leagues, it was entered into by cities due to being compelled to, due to power structures in the region or for one's own state of security in the face of other threats. However, if another option presented itself that appeared more in line with their interests, cities were likely to at least entertain negotiations. As I said, this is probably our best guess on the situation, given the one-line Thucydides gives us. However, although the suffering at Delium may have led to the shift in policy at Thespia, it had also weakened the city greatly. Once thieves had gotten wind of the possible rebellious activities, they decided to act as we have seen within the Peloponnesian League and the Athenian Empire. If a city looked to leave, they would be treated as a revolting city. For a league to maintain its strength, it had to retain its unity.
Speaker 2:Thebes felt confident in marching out to Thespia and proceeded to dismantle their walls. With the majority of the Thespian fighting men having become casualties the previous year, they were in a very weak position to defend themselves. Thespia was also situated on level ground. Most cities were built on high ground for better defence, so this destruction of their walls would make them extremely vulnerable to any army more powerful than they were. This would then have the effect of the government within Thespia to fall back in line with Thebes, who was at the head of the Boeotian League, or risk the destruction of the city.
Speaker 2:The other event that Thucydides found notable to report as taking place during the summer of 423 did not involve combatants, but was the result of a supposed accident within the city of Argos. At this stage, argos had managed to mainly remain neutral in the Peloponnesian War, and as we continue, we will see how this stance would bring them popularity from other cities. This would end up seeing them gain enough political influence to challenge Sparta and Athens in the near future. However, during the summer, the Temple of Hera in the city was burnt down by the long-serving priestess. This was through an accident where the priestess rested a torch near some garlands and fell asleep. By the time she awoke to the fire, a huge blaze had taken over. She was able to escape, but through fear of the Argives, she fled the city. This was the temple that had been built during Argos's early stages in the 8th century and served as its main sacred space. However, over the next 10 years, a new temple to Hera would be constructed, though there are suggestions that the planning for this new temple was not a replacement for the burnt down one, as there had been plans for a new construction before this to accommodate the growth of the Argive state.
Speaker 2:These were the main events to take place in and around Greece in relation to the Peloponnesian War for the summer of 423. Heading into the winter, sparta and Athens outside of Thrace remained quiet towards one another. Within the Peloponnese, however, the cities of Tygia and Mantinea, who had always had territorial disputes, would engage in a regional war with their respective allies. The battle that developed would see an undecided result, with both sides having defeated opposite wings and both would claim victory. This battle appears to have concluded the current round of hostilities between the two, with both sides having suffered heavy casualties.
Speaker 2:While up in Thrace, brasidas, with the Athenian counterattack going on, would attempt one more push to disrupt their position. His target was the Athenian base at Potidaea. If this could be taken, it would severely undermine Athens' position in the area. Perhaps now, with Spartan government representatives in the area and Athens' push to recapture the revolting cities, brasidas saw this as his last chance to make a daring push to bring the advantage back to him and with it support for his campaign from Sparta. Brasidas, again, would not look to fight a decisive battle for the city due to the size of his army, with a number of his troops tied up with garrison duties in other cities, he would look to try and take the city by surprise at night. He had succeeded in having a ladder placed on the walls of the city, unnoticed, though, before the men of the assaulting force could be brought up. The attempt on the wall was discovered by the garrison. The alarm now raised. Brassidas saw that his surprise attempt had failed, since his forces had not yet breached the wall. He fell back to his men and led them off while it was still dark and they were to escape from the area. This would see the end of the action in Thrace for 423. However, next episode we'll be returning to the region where the Athenians would ramp up their efforts in recapturing the rebellious cities and other possessions. Cleon would also make for the region with an army, and we would see a battle develop over the city.
Speaker 2:That had seen Brasidas' strike at the Athenians begin and Phippolis this year had marked the first time a truce had taken place in the war, with hopes that a longer peace could be negotiated. Brasidas' campaign had put the truce and the potential peace at risk, with his actions taking place shortly after this arrangement. Although the Spartan government wanted a peace to exist with Athens, they had also seen Brasidas had gained an advantage for them in the north. They were willing to accept his reasoning that he had taken Scone before the truce was in effect, since it helped their position. However, it seems clear they did not truly believe this, as they would eventually send reinforcements to the north and even though they were prevented passage through Thessaly, the commanders and other officials made it into the region. Here a number would be assigned to the various cities Sparta had under their control. This an attempt to run their affairs in accordance with the Spartan government wishes, not Brasidas'. They saw that his actions were harming their ability to negotiate a lasting peace. The truce in place was now fast approaching its end, with it supposed to be in place for one year. However, it was hoped that the peace could still be possible even with Brasidas' actions that had seen suspicion and anger in Athens grow with each new move he had made.
Speaker 2:Thank you all for the support and continuing to support the series. It is greatly appreciated. I'd like to give an extra special thank you to all my Patreon Archon members, so a big shout out to Neil Bennett, ali Ullman, nick Kabifakis, paul from Inga, matthew and John for choosing to support the series over on Patreon and supporting at the Archon level. If you've also found some value in the series and wish to support the show, you can head to wwwcastingthoranxiagreasecom and click on the support the series button, where you can find the link to Patreon as well as many other ways to support the show. Be sure to stay connected and updated on what's happening in the series and join me over on Facebook or Instagram at Casting Thoranxiagrease or on Twitter at Casting Greece. Once again, thanks for the support and I hope you can join me next episode where we continue the narrative in the series you.